For                 Muhammad Imran C/O
      Haji Muhammad Saleem Chotia Advocate


2012 S C M R 695

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Ejaz Afzal Khan and Muhammad Athar Saeed, JJ

QAMAR SULTAN and others---Petitioners

Versus

Mst. BIBI SUFAIDAN and others---Respondents

Civil Petition No.1131 of 2010 and C.M.A. No.1754 of 2010, decided on 2nd March, 2012.
           
(On appeal against the judgment dated 26-5-2010 passed by Lahore  High  Court,  Rawalpindi  Bench,  Rawalpindi  in C.R. No.69 of 2002).

(a) Islamic Law---

----Inheritance---Sect---Deceased being issueless left behind a mother and sister---Mother's statement in court to the effect that her deceased son was shia by faith---Validity---Sister would retain remaining property, if deceased was found to be a shia by faith---Such evidence of mother aimed at benefiting her daughter was interested and discarded in circumstances.

(b) West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)---

----S. 135---Partition of agricultural property---Jurisdiction of Revenue court or civil court---Scope---Jurisdiction to grant such relief would lay with Revenue court---Decree of civil court granting such relief would be nullity in eye of law.

(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---

----Arts. 76(f), 78 & 85(1)(iii)--- Secondary evidence--- Proof of signature on an application by a person since deceased---Scope---Application by said person (deceased) to Deputy Commissioner---Tendering of certified copy in evidence without proving signature of deceased on such application---Validity---Secondary evidence to prove such signature on such copy would not be necessary for same being certified copy of such application.
           
Ch. Mushtaq Ahmed Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.
           
Gulzarin Kiani, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 3, 4 and 5.
           
Ch. Abdul Aziz, Naib Tehsildar for Respondents Nos.7 and 8.
           
Date of hearing: 2nd March, 2012.

JUDGMENT
           
EJAZ AFZAL KHAN, J.---This petition for leave to appeal has arisen out of the judgment dated 26-5-2010 of the Lahore High Court whereby the learned Judge in his chambers dismissed the petition filed by the petitioners and maintained the judgment and decree of the learned Appellate Court.

2.         Brief facts of the case as spelt out in paragraph-1 of the impugned judgment read as under:--

"The summary of facts of this case is that predecessor-in-interest of the respondents instituted suit for possession in respect of land measuring 3888 kanals and 1 marla, mentioned in the plaint, for partition of 1/6th share out of Haveli and for rendition of accounts being legal heirs of Fateh Khan son of Allah Dad. Fateh Khan died on 3-6-1970. Mst. Anwar Sultan, defendant No.1 being the mother; Mst. Qamar Sultan being sister and Mumraiz Khan being collateral were legal heirs of Fateh Khan. As per averments of the plaint, Fateh Khan was Sunni by faith, therefore, Mumraiz Khan, plaintiff being a collateral  was  entitled  to  1/6th  share.  It  was  further averred that Mutation Nos.1764 and 433 having been sanctioned on 14-8-1970 in accordance with Shia law were illegal. In the written statement filed by present petitioners/defendants, it was averred that the deceased Fateh Khan professed Shia faith, therefore, estate of Fateh Khan devolved upon the petitioners in toto. In view of the pleadings of the petitioners, the learned trial Court framed Issues. The parties led their oral as well as documentary evidence. D.Ws.­1 to 5 supported the averments made in the written statement and contended that Fateh Khan was unmarried and died issueless. Mst. Anwar Sultan was his mother  and  Mst. Qamar Sultan was her sister. He professed Shia  sect  and  used to participate in the 'Tazia Procession'. Mst. Anwar Sultan appeared as D.W.6 and stated that Fateh Khan was Shia by faith from the time of his predecessor. The defendants also produced copy of Mutation No.1764 sanctioned on 24-8-1971, as Exh.D1 and copy of Mutation No.433 as Exh.D2, sanctioned on 24-8-1971. The respondents-plaintiffs produced nine witnesses who deposed that Fateh Khan was 'Sunni' by faith and his 'Fatiha prayer' was led by a 'Sunni Sect Scholar'. The plaintiffs also produced documentary evidence. The learned Civil Judge, Attock, who vide judgment and decree dated 23-10-2000 dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs-respondents. The appeal filed by the respondents was accepted by the learned Additional District Judge, Attock, who vide judgment and decree dated 22-12-2001 decreed the suit of the respondents."

3.         Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners contended that where sufficient evidence was brought on the record to prove that Fateh Muhammad, the propositus of the parties was professing Shia faith, suit filed by the respondent could not be decided on the basis of presumption. The rule, the learned counsel added, laid down in the case of Pathana v. Mst. Wasai and another (PLD 1965 SC 134) that the initial presumption in the Indian subcontinent that a Muslim is governed by Hanafi Law unless the contrary is proved is not absolute. The learned counsel by referring to the case of Muhammad Bashir and another v. Mst. Latifa Bibi through legal heirs (2010 SCMR 1915) contended that faith of a person and determination thereof depends on the circumstances he lived in, including his way of life, the parental faith and the faith of his other kith and kin, therefore, no rule of universal application can be laid down in this behalf. The learned counsel next contended that where mother of the deceased being closely related to him stated that he was professing Shia faith, it was to be believed in as no other evidence could be more reliable than that of her. Learned counsel by referring to the application allegedly signed by the deceased, besides others, requesting the Deputy Commissioner of the District not to permit the Shias of the village to take out a procession could not be made the sole basis for drawing an inference that the deceased was not a Shia by faith when the said application was not proved in accordance with the requirements of the law to have been signed by him. He by referring to the case of Muhammad Din and others v. Niamat Bibi and others (2006 SCMR 586) contended that where the finding of the trial court and that of Court of Appeal were at variance with each other on contentious questions of law and facts, the High Court was not supposed to dispose of the revision summarily without re-appraising the entire evidence. The learned  counsel  by  concluding  his  arguments  submitted  that  relief viz-a-viz  partition  of  agricultural  property  could  not  have  been granted  by  the  Civil  Court  as  it  lay  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the Revenue Court, therefore, any degree thus passed would be nullity in the eye of law.

4.         As against that, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents contended that all the Courts including High Court after proper  appraisal  of  evidence  declared  that  the  deceased  was a Sunni and not Shia by faith, therefore, such finding is not open to any interference when it is free from any taint of misreading and non-reading of evidence.

5.         We have gone through the entire record carefully and considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties.

6.         The learned trial Court after discussing the evidence on the record held as under:--
           
"10. The presumption that deceased Fateh Khan was Sunni goes in favour of plaintiff as has been held in PLD 1965 SC 134 that initial presumption in Indo-Pak Sub-continent is that a Muslim is a Sunni, unless contrary is established by good evidence. The defendant had to prove that the deceased Fateh Khan was Shia. To prove this fact, they examined D.W.1. He is resident of Mauza Jandial, D.W.2 is resident of Talagang. D.W.3 is resident of Mauza Gakhar and D.W.4 is also resident of Talagang. D.W.5 is the mother of deceased. She is beneficiary of transaction. Major discrepancies are found in the statement of D.Ws. D.W.­1 has deposed that there is no Shia mosque in Dhurnal. There was no Shia Maulvi and Imam Barah in the village, D.W.2 has deposed that no Shia was known to him except Fateh Khan. Fateh Khan name was not incorporated in the register meant for members of Shai Sect. D.W.3 is not aware of true fact. D.W.5 has not rebutted the statement of Maulvi Muhammad Faazil. She has stated that she was not aware of the fact that who led the funeral prayer of Fateh Khan. All the P.Ws. have deposed that Fateh Khan was Sunni by Sect. Maulvi Fazil P.W.1 is an independent witness. He has deposed that funeral prayer was led by him. He has clearly stated that Fateh Khan was follower of Sunni Sect.
           
11. Learned counsel for defendant has pointed out that P.Ws. are closely related to the deceased. That they are having enmity with  the  defendant.  The  statement  of  P.Ws.  cannot be discarded on this ground. The plaintiffs have brought on record copy of documents Exh.P.10 to Exh.P.12. The application by Allah Yar Khan Exh.P.11 was given to Deputy Commissioner on 12-6-1971 for permission of holding procession. Statements were recorded. An application was also given in the form of Exh.P.10 for uzadari. This application was contested by the deceased Fateh Khan and was bearing his signatures. This shows that Fateh Khan was Sunni and was against holding Shia procession. The evidence on record shows that there was no Shia in Dhuranl village. The deceased Fateh Khan belongs to Sardar Family. He was owner in estate. There was no Shia mosque till the time of his death. He had been saying congregation (Jumma) prayer with Sunni Muslims. He was an affluent and could make Imam Bargah for himself but this was not done by him during his life time."

7.         The learned Additional District Judge while concurring with the finding of the learned trial Court on this issue held as under:--

"10. Now I come to the case of the appellants that apart from initial presumption what is the other evidence with them. Exh.P.11 is the copy of an application moved by one Allah Yar to the then Deputy Commissioner Cambelpur where he had requested for the issuance of licence for the procession in the month of Moharram in the village of the deceased. This application is dated 3-3-1966. Exh.P.10 is the copy of the order of the then Deputy Commissioner which shows that not only the deceased but the other villagers opposed the said application with the plea that only four/five persons in the village of the deceased were affiliated to Shia and the remaining entire abadi is of Sunni, hence due to the procession there is the possibility of apprehension of breach of peace and earlier such type of applications had been dismissed. This document was also signed by the deceased. These two documents are the most important document in relation to which the counsel for the respondents contended these cannot relied upon having not been proved. This argument has no force on the reason that the said copies have been brought on the judicial record from the custody of the office who is duly authorized to obtain the same and to issue these documents. These two documents are covered by under Article 85 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat being public documents and under Article 91 the presumption of genuineness is attached to them. There is no rebuttal to these two documents, hence these two documents will exclude the ocular testimony furnished by the respondents and their witnesses and will be used in favour of the appellants."

8. The High Court while maintaining the finding of the fora below held as under:--
           
"4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record. The plaintiffs claiming Fateh Khan Sunni by faith have produced the witnesses from Shia and Sunni communities. They have categorically stated that Fateh Khan was Sunni by faith and his funeral prayer was led by Maulvi Muhammad Faazal/P.W.1, who was a Sunni Sect Scholar. On the other hand the defendants have also produced witnesses from both Sunni and Shai Sect, who have categorically stated that Fateh Khan professed Shia faith and used to part in Tazia Procession. The only edge to the defendants/petitioners in the oral evidence is the statement of Mst. Anwar Sultan, who is mother of Fateh Khan. She has stated that Fateh Khan professed Shia faith.
           
Although in either eventuality whether Fateh Khan is held to be a Shia or Sunni her 1/3 share remains unchanged but the share of Mst. Qamar Sultan, sister of Fateh Khan daughter of Anwar Sultan increases from 1/2 to 2/3, if Fateh Khan is declared Shia and resultantly Mumraiz Khan the predecessor of the respondents is deprived of his 1/6 share as a collateral. Mst. Anwar Sultan is an indirect beneficiary. Her daughters shares increased and her rivals share extinguishes. Moreover, the petitioners cannot escape a big hump in their way. Exh.10 an application by the Sunni inhabitants of the village including Fateh Khan was filed to thwart an effort of Allah Yar, P.W.8, a Shia by faith to get permission to take out Tazia procession. This application betrays strong abhorrence against those who were trying to hold the procession. These sentiments are a proof of the faith of the applicants including that of Fateh Khan. Did he change his faith from Sunni to Shia after that application and statement? There is neither an assertion in the written statement nor any proof of that in evidence. The principle laid down by the superior judiciary is that great majority of the Muslims in Indo-Pak Subcontinent being Sunnis, the presumption would be that the parties to the suit are Sunnis, unless its proved otherwise. The burden to rebut the presumption would lie heavily on the one who attributes the faith of Shia to any person. Reliance is placed on Pathana v. Mst. Wasai and others (PLD 1965 SC 134) and Ghulam Shabbir and others v. Mst. Bakhat Khatoon and others (2009 SCMR 644). As far the dictum laid down in (PLD 2006 SC 1476) titled (Mst. Ghulam Ayesha and another v. Sardar Sher Khan) and (2009 SCMR 644) titled (Ghulam Shabbir and others v. Mst. Bakhat Khatoon and others); that leading the funeral prayer by a Sunni Imam is no proof of the faith of the deceased that reduces the strength of the arguments of the respondents only to that extent. The evidence led by the plaintiffs/respondents to this extent may be excluded from their credit. The documentary evidence referred above weighs heavily in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs and against the petitioners/defendants. The only conclusion that may be drawn is that Fateh Khan was a Sunni by faith. I find neither any illegality in the concurrent findings of both the courts below nor any irregularity in the proceedings".

9.         A look at the above quoted paragraphs of the trial, appellate and revisional Courts would reveal that they, after discussing the entire evidence on the record, concluded that deceased was not a Shia but a Sunni by faith. They were swayed not by presumption alone but by the preponderance of evidence on the record which unmistakably shows that the deceased was a Sunni and not a Shia by faith. The learned counsel during the course of arguments tried to give a hype to the evidence of the mother of the deceased by submitting that no person could afford to have better knowledge about the faith of the deceased than his mother but her evidence was discarded without any tenable reason. A perusal of the judgments of the fora below as well as the High Court would reveal that not only her but the entire evidence available on the record was examined keeping in view the circumstances the deceased lived in including  his  way  of  life,  the  faith  of  his  parents  and  other  kith and  kin  including  his  sister.  The  evidence  of  his  mother  was  found  interested,  is  as  much  as  it  aimed  at  benefiting  her  daughter who was to retain the remaining property if her son was proved to be a Shia by faith. The other part of the contention also appears to be incorrect as all the Courts recorded cogent reasons for discarding her and other evidence.

10.       The proposition that when the relief vis-a-vis partition of an agricultural property lay within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court, any decree passed by the Civil Court in this behalf is nullity in the eye of law, is no doubt correct, but in this case the Civil Court has not passed any such decree. Yes, no secondary evidence has been produced in the Court to prove the signature of the deceased on the application mentioned above but, to our mind that was not necessary, because it was a certified copy of the application thus moved. When considered in this background, we don't think the impugned finding can be said to have been based on misreading and non-reading of evidence or erroneous assumptions of law and facts. We, therefore, do not feel persuaded to grant leave in this case.

11.       For the reasons discussed above, this petition being without merit is dismissed.

C.M.A. No.1754 of 2010

12.       As the petition for leave to appeal has been dismissed, this C.M.A. for suspension of the impugned judgment having become infructuous is also dismissed.

                                                                                                                          Leave refused.

For Muhammad Nawaz Awan C/O 
Abdul RasheedSajid Advocate


2011 P Cr. L J 1549

[Lahore]

Before Manzoor Ahmad Malik, J

MUHAMMAD YAR---Petitioner

Versus

THE STATE and another---Respondents

Criminal Miscellaneous No. 269-B of 2011, decided on 27th January, 2011.

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.496-A---Enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a woman---Pre-arrest bail, grant of---Alleged abductee, daughter of complainant, in her two statements made before Magistrate on different dates had not mentioned anything regarding her abduction, whereas in her subsequent statements recorded by the Police and under S.164, Cr.P.C. she had implicated the accused---Mala fides on the part of the complainant for false implication of accused could not be ruled out---Ad interim pre-arrest bail already allowed to accused was confirmed in circumstances. 

Malik Muhammad Ghazanfar Ali Khokhar for Petitioner.

Arshad Mahmood, Deputy Prosecutor-General for the State.

Bashir Ahmad Qureshi for the Complainant.


ORDER

MANZOOR AHMAD MALIK, J.---Muhammad Yar, petitioner, seeks bail before arrest in case F.I.R. No.773 of 2010 dated 9-11-2010 offence under section 496-A, P.P.C. registered at Police Station City Depalpur, District Okara. Precisely allegation against the petitioner is that he along with his co-accused enticed away/abducted Mst. Kausar Bibi daughter of the complainant.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of this petition, contends that as per F.I.R. Mst. Kausar Bibi daughter of the complainant was enticed away/abducted on 8-11-2010; that as a matter of fact she was not abducted or enticed away by anybody which is clear from the statement which she made before the learned Magistrate on 10-11-2010 wherein she stated that she has been ousted by her husband after giving beating and even her parents have refused to allow her to live with them; that the alleged abductee further stated that she has serious apprehension to life and she wants to live in Darulaman; that in the said statement she did not say anything regarding her alleged abduction; that thereafter she again appeared before the learned Magistrate on 25-11-2010 and stated that she wanted to go to the house of her parents; that in both these statements there is no mention that said Mst. Kausar Bibi was abducted or enticed away by the petitioner or anybody; that the petitioner is owner of a plot in Lohariwala Depalpur which is close to the house of Muhammad Abdullah witness of this F.I:R. who is pressurizing the petitioner to sell that plot in his favour on throwaway price and on his refusal, on the asking of the said Muhammad Abdullah a false case has been registered against the petitioner.

3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the complainant opposes this bail petition on the grounds that the petitioner is nominated in the F.I.R. with the specific allegation of abduction; that Mst. Kausar Bibi victim got recorded her statement under sections 161 and 164 Code of Criminal Procedure wherein she fully implicated the petitioner in the commission of crime; that section 376, P.P.C. has also been added in the F.I.R.; that there is no mala fide on the part of the complainant and there is sufficient incriminating evidence against the petitioner; that the petitioner has been found guilty during the course of investigation and the offence alleged against him falls within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure.

4. Learned Deputy Prosecutor-General though opposes this bail petition but states that the Police in its investigation has verified the fact that Mst. Kausar Bibi made voluntary statements before the learned Magistrate on two occasions and in fact she has a liaison with the petitioner.

5. I have heard learned counsel for both the sides. It is mentioned in the F.I.R. that on 8-11-2010 Mst. Naila Bibi alias Rani and Jameel Shehnaz came to the house of the complainant and enticed away daughter of the complainant namely Mst. Kausar Bibi, however, later on Muhammad Ramzan and Muhammad Abdullah informed him that Kausar Bibi had been enticed away/abducted by the petitioner and his co-accused. Said Mst. Kausar Bibi appeared before the learned Magistrate on 10-11-2010 i.e. after registration of the F.I.R. and made a statement which is to the effect that her husband has turned her out of his house and even her parents are not allowing her to live with them and she has serious apprehension to her life. She further stated that she wants to live in Darulaman. She was sent to Darulaman. Then she made another statement before the learned Magistrate on 25-11-2010 wherein she stated that now she wants to go to the house of her parents as she has no apprehension to her life. In both these statements she has not mentioned anything regarding her abduction. These circumstances create doubt in the prosecution case. Though no specific mala fide has been alleged by the petitioner and he has stated that witness of the case namely Muhammad Abdullah is pressurizing him to sell his plot in his favour. But mala fide can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. In this case the alleged abductee while appearing before the learned Magistrate on 10-11-2010 and 25-11-2010 has not stated anything regarding her `abduction whereas in her subsequent statements, which were recorded by the police and under section 164, Cr.P.C, she has implicated the petitioner. In the circumstances, mala fide on the part of the complainant for false implication of the petitioner cannot be ruled A out. Therefore, this is a fit case for the grant of bail before arrest. This petition is accordingly allowed and the ad interim pre-arrest bail already allowed to the petitioner vide order dated 11-1-2011 is hereby confirmed subject to his furnishing fresh bail bond in the sum of Rs.1,00,000 (rupees one lac only) with one surety in the like amount to" the satisfaction of learned trial Court.

6. Before parting with this order, it is clarified that the observations made in this order are tentative in nature and relevant only for the disposal of this bail petition, which shall not influence the learned trial Court in any manner whatsoever.

                                                                                                                   Pre-arrest bail allowed.
  

freelawservices: For   Pir Saqab Ali Chishti Advocate  1997 C LC ...

freelawservices: For   Pir Saqab Ali Chishti Advocate

1997 C LC ...
: For   Pir Saqab Ali Chishti Advocate   1997 C L C 657 [Lahore] Before Ausaf Ali Khan, J ABDUL GHAFFAR‑‑‑Appellant ver...

Wednesday, December 25, 2013

For   Pir Saqab Ali Chishti Advocate  


1997 C L C 657

[Lahore]

Before Ausaf Ali Khan, J

ABDUL GHAFFAR‑‑‑Appellant
versus

PUBLIC IN GENERAL and others‑‑‑Respondents

First Appeal From Order No. 26 of 1993/BWP, decided on 17th October, 1993.

Lunacy Act (IV of 1912)‑‑‑


‑‑‑‑S.62‑‑‑Allegation of lunacy‑‑‑Duty of Court‑‑‑Standard of mental capacity of the alleged lunatic‑‑‑Test‑‑‑Inquisition for purpose of ascertaining whether alleged lunatic was of unsound mind and incapable of managing himself and his affairs‑‑‑Essentials‑‑‑Court was required to form its own independent judgment on the mental state of such person‑‑‑Court must satisfy itself by enquiry and personal interview with alleged lunatic that there was ground for inquisition‑‑‑ Question of mental capacity was one for Court to decide and not for the Doctor‑‑‑Court could not be relieved by medical testimony of its obligation to form its independent opinion‑‑‑Exigency to refer such matter to specialist could arise only after examining lunatic and dependent upon observation of Court that alleged lunatic appeared to be lunatic and incapable of looking after his person and property‑‑‑Court's order which had been passed without examining alleged lunatic and same was based on doctor's opinion that said person was not lunatic was not warranted‑‑‑‑Being eccentric slightly weak in head are subnormal intellect would not amount to unsoundness of mind‑‑‑Court was directed to examine alleged lunatic and refer the matter to specialist of Mental Asylum only if it felt necessity to do so‑‑‑Where, however, alleged lunatic qualified minimum standard of mental health and conception of day to day matters, then Court need not solicit opinion of specialist.

Mst. Jamila Begum v. Awam‑un‑Nass and 15 others PLD 1978 Lah 1376 ref

Muhammad Javed Iqbal Qureshi for Appellant.
Mian Ahmad Naveed Arshad for Respondents. Date of hearing: 17th October, 1993.

JUDGMENT


Muhammad Ashraf, alleged lunatic is living with his brother and nephews, herein the respondents Nos.2 to 6. Abdul Ghaffar, herein the petitioner, also brother of said Muhammad Ashraf filed application under section 62/f1 of the Lunacy Act (IV of 1912) seeking it to be declared by the District Court, Bahawalnagar that Muhammad Ashraf was a lunatic, incapable of looking after his person and property.

2. The respondents opposed the petition and in their joint averment asserted Muhammad Ashraf to be perfectly healthy and normal man capable of managing his affairs.

3. After securing presence of the respondents, the learned Additional District Judge referred the matter to the Medical Superintendent, District Headquarter Hospital, Bahawalnagar who vide his report, dated the 18th of August, 1993 found Muhammad Ashraf answering the questions satisfactorily, fully conscious, well‑oriented in time, person and space with memory intact. The petitioner, however, was not satisfied with the report as it had emanated from officiating Medical Superintendent as the Medical Superintendent was on leave on the date of examination. The petitioner, however, insisted that Muhammad Ashraf should be examined in the Mental Asylum, Lahore by a specialist. This plea earlier raised was not accepted by the learned trial Court and also by virtue of the order, dated the 13th of July, 1993 which is now impugned in appeal.

4. Section 62 of the Lunacy Act relates to power of the District Courts to institute inquisition as to person alleged to be lunatic by providing:‑‑

"Where any person is possessed of property and is alleged to be a lunatic, the District Court, within whose jurisdiction such person is residing may, upon application, by order direct an inquisition for the purpose of ascertaining whether such person is of unsound mind and incapable of managing himself and his affairs."

5. It need not be over‑emphasised that jurisdiction of the District Courts to take further action for custody of person or protection of property is dependent upon finding that a person is of unsound mind and incapable of managing himself or his affairs. When an application is for directing an inquisition the first thing which has to be done by the trial Court is to ascertain, either with notice to the lunatic or without notice, if the case is one which calls for an order directing an inquisition. It is in fact for the Court to form its own independent judgment on the point. The learned trial Court has to satisfy itself by enquiry and personal interview with the alleged lunatic that there is ground for inquisition. This Court had laid down guidelines in Mst. Jamila Begum v. Awam‑un‑Nass and 15 others (PLD 1978 Lahore 1376) that the Court should summon the alleged lunatic and put up homely questions keeping in view the feable‑mindedness and weak intellect of the person alleged to be a lunatic. He could be examined on dietary habits as well as on other points, how was he treated by his relatives with whom he was living, how much land he had, who cultivated it and such like questions.

6. In the instant case learned trial Court had not examined the alleged lunatic. In fact question of mental capacity is one for Court to decide and not for Doctor and the Court cannot be relieved by medical testimony of its obligation to form an independent opinion. It need not be gainsaid that being eccentric, slightly weak in head, or subnormal in intellect does not amount to unsoundness of mind. Of course after examining the alleged lunatic, the Court could refer to matter to the Doctor. Here the officiating Medical Superintendent had examined the alleged lunatic and found him to be normal man. Opinion of the Doctor is relevant and worthy of consideration in view of provisions of section 18 read with section 3 (7) of the Lunacy Act. No doubt the opinion of the Medical Superintendent, Government Mental Hospital, Lahore, being specialist on the subject could furnish better evidence but the learned District Court did not have resort to this course because it was too inconvenient for the concerned, besides being expensive and time consuming. The exigency to refer the matter to the specialist could arise in this case only after examining the lunatic and dependant upon observation of the Court that the alleged lunatic appeared to be lunatic and incapable of looking after his person and property.

7. In view of what stated above, I partly accept the appeal and modify the impugned order with the direction to the learned Additional District Judge to examine the alleged lunatic and refer the matter to the specialist of Mental Asylum only if he feels the necessity to do so. If the lunatic qualified the minimum standard of mental health and conception of day to day matters, then the Court need not solicit opinion of the specialist as the opinion of the local Doctor is already there on the subject and he can very well further proceed with the case. The parties are left to bear their own costs.

                                                                                        Appeal partly allowed


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freelawservices: Trile 489-F ppcFrom Accused for Acquittal2013 P Cr...: Trile 489-F ppc From Accused for Acquittal 2013 P Cr. L J 175 [Balochistan] Before Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Ghulam Mustafa Mengal,...